Theories of Truth: Difference between revisions
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There appear to be two sides to the coin when determining 'what is truth?'. There is an objective school and a pragmatic school for truth. The objective school represents notions that are true independent of their value to the student. In the latter theory, a notion is true if its acceptance maintains a higher living standard than its dismissal or questioning by the student. The pragmatic truth | There appear to be two sides to the coin when determining 'what is truth?'. There is an objective school and a pragmatic school for truth. The objective school represents notions that are true independent of their value to the student. In the latter theory, a notion is true if its acceptance maintains a higher living standard than its dismissal or questioning by the student. The pragmatic truth is maintained by refusal to question its origins and dismissal of possible alternatives if desirable. For example, religious beliefs have a certain pragmatic truth to them, independent of their objective truth content --> e.g. Giordano Bruno, atheism-theism debates etc.. Similarly, scientific paradigm shifts may also be somewhat resisted by scientists who have spent a lot of energy on a certain idea that is being undermined by a new, objective truth. This commitment on the scientists' behalf imparts a subjective, pragmatic property to them, hampering an objective investigation of their owner into their origins and possible alternatives. Therefore, considerable resistance can be expected for large paradigm shifts. | ||
To students of the objective school, teachings of the subjective school can be seen as logical fallacies and their rectification can be seen as desirable. However, students of the subjective school may benefit from their teachings in such a way that it would be doing them a disfavor to teach them objective truths. Only when truthfulness of a certain notion does not provide any pragmatic benefit to their owner, will and should an objective investigation be readily accepted and encouraged. Where a notion is pragmatically true but objectively false, differences in belief have potential to fuel ardent debate. The fly in the ointment in these cases is often differing subscription to schools of truth rather than any specific arguments of the quarreling parties. This could explain the persistence of arguments on matters such as religion. | To students of the objective school, teachings of the subjective school can be seen as logical fallacies and their rectification can be seen as desirable. However, students of the subjective school may benefit from their teachings in such a way that it would be doing them a disfavor to teach them objective truths. Only when truthfulness of a certain notion does not provide any pragmatic benefit to their owner, will and should an objective investigation be readily accepted and encouraged. Where a notion is pragmatically true but objectively false, differences in belief have potential to fuel ardent debate. The fly in the ointment in these cases is often differing subscription to schools of truth rather than any specific arguments of the quarreling parties. This could explain the persistence of arguments on matters such as religion. |
Revision as of 23:41, 2 January 2015
There appear to be two sides to the coin when determining 'what is truth?'. There is an objective school and a pragmatic school for truth. The objective school represents notions that are true independent of their value to the student. In the latter theory, a notion is true if its acceptance maintains a higher living standard than its dismissal or questioning by the student. The pragmatic truth is maintained by refusal to question its origins and dismissal of possible alternatives if desirable. For example, religious beliefs have a certain pragmatic truth to them, independent of their objective truth content --> e.g. Giordano Bruno, atheism-theism debates etc.. Similarly, scientific paradigm shifts may also be somewhat resisted by scientists who have spent a lot of energy on a certain idea that is being undermined by a new, objective truth. This commitment on the scientists' behalf imparts a subjective, pragmatic property to them, hampering an objective investigation of their owner into their origins and possible alternatives. Therefore, considerable resistance can be expected for large paradigm shifts.
To students of the objective school, teachings of the subjective school can be seen as logical fallacies and their rectification can be seen as desirable. However, students of the subjective school may benefit from their teachings in such a way that it would be doing them a disfavor to teach them objective truths. Only when truthfulness of a certain notion does not provide any pragmatic benefit to their owner, will and should an objective investigation be readily accepted and encouraged. Where a notion is pragmatically true but objectively false, differences in belief have potential to fuel ardent debate. The fly in the ointment in these cases is often differing subscription to schools of truth rather than any specific arguments of the quarreling parties. This could explain the persistence of arguments on matters such as religion.